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HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 This appeal presents yet another dispute between real 
estate developer Frank Acierno ("Acierno") and New Castle County, 
Delaware ("the County") over Acierno's commercial development 
plans for land in the County.  The underlying action is Acierno's 
request for declaratory and injunctive relief and compensatory 
and punitive damages for the County's alleged violations of the 
Constitution and laws of the United States and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 
(West 1994).1  Presently before us is the County's appeal from an 
                     
1.  42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 provides, in relevant part: 
 
 Every person who, under color of [law], 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
. . . person . . . to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to 
the party injured . . . . 
 
 
order entered by the United States District Court for the 
District of Delaware granting Acierno's motion for a mandatory 
preliminary injunction directing the County to issue Acierno a 
building permit for development of a shopping mall.  The 
preliminary injunction also enjoins and restrains the County from 
interfering with Acierno's right to develop the parcel in 
question as a shopping mall. 
 In issuing its preliminary injunction, the district 
court held that Acierno established a substantial likelihood that 
the County's actions interfered with Acierno's Fourteenth 
Amendment property interests and his liberty interest to conduct 
his business as a real estate developer.  The district court also 
concluded that Acierno would suffer irreparable harm unless the 
County was compelled to issue the building permit and halt its 
interference with Acierno's development.  Finally, the court 
concluded that neither potential hardship to the County nor the 
public interest outweighed the benefits of issuing the 
preliminary injunction. 
 On appeal, the County argues Acierno failed to show he 
will be irreparably harmed unless a preliminary injunction issues 
against the County.  We agree.  A primary purpose of a 
preliminary injunction is maintenance of the status quo until a 
decision on the merits of a case is rendered.  A mandatory 
preliminary injunction compelling issuance of a building permit 
fundamentally alters the status quo.  There is no evidence in 
this record to show that a delay in issuance of the building 
permit until this case can be decided on its merits would cause 
 
 
irreparable harm to Acierno.  We will therefore reverse the 
district court's order entering this mandatory preliminary 
injunction against the County.2 
 
 I.  Factual & Procedural History 
 A.  General Factual Background 
 In 1971 Acierno was a long term lessor of a large part 
of some forty acres of land situated in New Castle County, 
Delaware near the intersection of Interstate Highway 95 and State 
Route 273.  This forty acre parcel was zoned M-1, Manufacturing, 
and the County's zoning ordinance then in effect permitted 
commercial development in an M-1 manufacturing zone.3  Acierno 
also owned an adjacent smaller parcel of land zoned C-2, 
Commercial, a portion of which is directly adjacent to Route 273.  
These two parcels comprise the property ("the Property"). 
 In 1971, County planning law required developers to 
file an "exploratory sketch plan" before the County would finally 
approve a subdivision plan.  On May 11, 1971, Acierno filed an 
"exploratory sketch plan" with the County Department of Planning 
                     
2.  On appeal, the County also challenges the district court's 
conclusions that Acierno demonstrated a likelihood of success on 
his procedural and substantive due process claims.  We do not 
decide these issues because of our conclusion that Acierno failed 
to show irreparable harm. 
3.  Zoning theory once took a hierarchial view of use zones.  In 
the hierarchy, a manufacturing use usually ranked below a 
commercial use.  The theory thus resulted in mixed uses within a 
single use zone.  It has been generally displaced because such 
mixed uses have come into disfavor among planners and many of the 
communities they serve. 
 
 
("the Planning Department") proposing development of an enclosed 
shopping mall on the Property.  On October 8, 1971, in accordance 
with County regulations, Acierno submitted a more detailed 
"preliminary-tentative building plan."  It described the enclosed 
mall as located entirely on the larger, forty acre portion of the 
Property zoned M-1.  On October 22, 1971, the Planning Department 
disapproved Acierno's preliminary-tentative plan.4 
 On November 16, 1971, the New Castle County Council 
("County Council") adopted an amendment to section 23-34 of the 
County Zoning Code prohibiting the commercial uses previously 
allowed in an M-1 Manufacturing zone.  Before this amendment was 
adopted, Acierno requested the County's Planning Board ("Planning 
Board")5 to hold an expedited special meeting to reconsider 
Acierno's preliminary-tentative plan.  At this meeting on 
November 8, 1971, the Planning Board reversed the Planning 
Department and approved Acierno's preliminary-tentative plan. 
 On January 24, 1972, Acierno filed a final plan 
("Plan") for his shopping center with the Planning Department 
but, on February 24, 1972, the Planning Department voted to 
                     
4.  The Planning Department found that the proposed plan was 
inconsistent with the County's comprehensive plan, would create 
adverse traffic congestion and had an unsuitable internal design. 
5.  Under Delaware law pertaining specifically to New Castle 
County, the Planning Department initially reviews subdivision 
proposals.  Del. Code Ann. tit. 9, § 1345 (1989).  A developer 
has a right of appeal from an adverse decision of the Planning 
Department to the Planning Board.  New Castle County Subdivision 
Regulations § 8.31; see Acierno v. Folsom, 337 A.2d 309, 311 
(1975).  The Planning Board consists of seven members appointed 
by the County Executive with the advice and consent of the 
County's attorney.  Del. Code Ann. tit. 9, § 1342 (1989). 
 
 
reject the final plan (1) because it conflicted with the general 
comprehensive development plan adopted for the County, (2) 
because the shape of the tract in issue made it unsuitable for 
the construction of a shopping center and (3) because of the 
impact of the increased traffic the proposed shopping center 
would bring.  Acierno appealed but this time, on April 26, 1972, 
the Planning Board affirmed the Planning Department's rejection.   
See Acierno v. Folsom, 313 A.2d 904, 905 (Del. Ch. 1973), aff'd 
311 A.2d 512 (Del. 1973). 
 A series of administrative and judicial appeals 
followed and, during a further hearing before the Planning Board, 
Board members voted as follows: 
 (1) 6 to 0 in favor of Acierno on the 
incompatibility of the Plan with the County's 
comprehensive development plan; 
 
 (2) 4 to 2 in favor of Acierno on the issue 
of unsuitable internal design of the project; 
and  
 
 (3) 3 to 3 to sustain Planning's rejection of 
Acierno's Plan because that the proposed 
development would have an adverse effect on 
vehicular traffic in the area. 
 
 
Id. at 905-06.  A member of the Planning Board who was absent 
from this hearing later advised the Chairman of the Planning 
Board that he would have voted to overrule the Planning 
Department on all three resolutions if he had been present.  See 
id. at 906.  County Council nevertheless affirmed the Planning 
Board's decision on January 9, 1973.  Id. 
 
 
 On March 14, 1975, however, the Delaware Supreme Court 
ordered County Council to approve and file Acierno's Plan.  See 
Acierno v. Folsom, 337 A.2d 309, 317 (Del. 1975) (reversing 
unreported Delaware Court of Chancery order granting summary 
judgment to County).  The supreme court first held that "an 
approval of the Planning Board was binding upon the Planning 
Department . . . and that . . . the County Council was obliged, 
as a ministerial function, to register its approval . . . ."  Id. 
at 313.  It also concluded that the Chairman of the Planning 
Board acted unlawfully in failing to recuse himself during the 
vote because of his apparent bias and prejudice towards Acierno 
and accordingly refused to count the Chairman's vote.  Id. at 
316.  This changed the vote on the effect of increased traffic, 
the only issue which had gone against Acierno, to 3-2 in his 
favor.  Id. at 317.  The state's highest court therefore held 
that a majority of the Planning Board members properly voting had 
approved Acierno's proposed development and County Council was 
bound by this decision.  Id.  In compliance, County Council 
approved Acierno's Plan on October 28, 1975. 
 Almost twelve years later, in September of 1987, 
Acierno submitted a revised subdivision plan ("Revised Plan") to 
the Planning Department.6  In it he proposed to:  (1) subdivide 
the Property into three parcels; (2) change building locations 
and sizes to accommodate the present market; and (3) correct 
drafting errors along some boundary courses. 
                     
6.  In the early 1980's, Acierno purchased the forty acre parcel, 
which he had previously leased. 
 
 
 In a memorandum dated January 26, 1988, Charles D. 
McCombs II of the Planning Department directed Acierno's 
engineers to "[p]rovide a note referencing previous court action 
that permitted commercial development in the M-1 zoning 
district[]" on the Revised Plan.  Appendix ("App.") at 335.  They 
did so and on February 25, 1988, County Planning Director Wayne 
Grafton ("Grafton") approved the Revised Plan for recording 
purposes.  On May 15, 1988, Grafton approved development of a 
"Hampton Inn" on the portion of the Property zoned M-1. 
 In November of 1988, Acierno submitted a revised 
subdivision plan amending the Revised Plan ("Revised Plan II").  
Revised Plan II stated its purpose was to "'revise buildings & 
parking for buildings 1, 2 & 3' and to 'correct drafting errors 
along some boundary courses.'"  App. at 336.  Otherwise, it was 
consistent with Revised Plan I.  On March 7, 1989, Grafton 
approved Revised Plan II.7 
 
                     
7.  On April 4, 1989, following Grafton's approval of Revised 
Plan II, the Department of Public Works notified Acierno's 
engineers that it had approved facility support plans for a 
McDonald's which Acierno planned to locate on the part of the 
Property zoned for commercial use.  On April 20, 1989, the 
Delaware Department of Transportation ("DELDOT") approved a 
permit for a commercial entrance to the Property at Route 273 
presumably in connection with the plans for the McDonald's. 
 
 
 B.  The County's Conduct Leading to the Present Action 
 On April 18, 1991, County Attorney Michael Mitchell 
("Mitchell") sent a memorandum to David J. Biloon ("Biloon"), 
Chief, Development and Licensing Division, Department of Public 
Works, New Castle County.  Mitchell's memorandum stated that he 
had reviewed the Delaware Chancery and Supreme Court opinions in 
the initial litigation in the mid-1970's over development of the 
Property, as well as a copy of the original Plan, the Revised 
Plan, and Revised Plan II.  Attorney Mitchell's memorandum 
concluded that most of the Property was not zoned for retail use, 
stating: 
 "[N]o building permit should be issued for 
any construction on this site until extensive 
review and consultation between the Division 
of Development and Licensing, Department of 
Planning and Department of Law is initiated 
and concluded concerning any proposed use.  
Given the types of tenants that he has 
approached; i.e., the movie theater chain, it 
is clear that Mr. Acierno intends to initiate 
a use of the property that is not in 
conformity with the New Castle Zoning Code. 
 
 In order to implement this directive, a 
general hold should be placed on any building 
permits that could be issued for this site.  
If that cannot be accomplished, all plan 
examiners and other officials involved in the 
building permit process should be advised of 
this situation and ordered to report any 
application for a building permit directly to 
you.  If Mr. Acierno applies for a Building 
Permit for the 273 Mall, please contact this 
Department so that the review discussed above 





Acierno v. New Castle County, No. 93-579-SLR, 1994 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 1683, at *34-35 (D. Del. Feb. 11, 1994) (emphasis added and 
emphasis in original deleted). 
 On May 3, 1991, Biloon circulated a memo within the 
County's Division of Development & Licensing which stated: 
 "Please inform your respective staffs to keep 
an eye out for any activity, i.e., building 
permit applications, for . . . the 273 Mall 
. . . . 
 
 We have been advised by the Law Department 
that there is a zoning problem at the 273 
Mall site.  Basically, the site is zoned M-1 
which will not support retail shopping uses.  
At this point in time, I will not try to 
explain the legal reasons as to why there is 
a valid Record Plan or why the Record Plan 
cannot be rescinded by the County; but, never 
the less [sic], we have been instructed by 
the Law Department to withhold building 
permits for any activity. . . ." 
 
 
Id. at *35-36 (emphasis deleted). 
 On July 9, 1991, Mitchell sent a memorandum to Bryan C. 
Shuler, Director of Planning.  In it, Mitchell recounted the 
history of the legal dispute over development of the Property and 
stated that Acierno's record plans should not be accorded "'any 
effect inasmuch as they purport to permit that which is not 
permitted by the Zoning Code.'"  Id. at *45.  Mitchell's 
conclusion that Acierno's recorded plans had no effect was based 
on his reading of section 23-6(a) of the New Castle County Code.8  
                     
8.  Section 23-6(a) and (c) provides: 
 
 (a)  No proposed ordinance to amend the 
zoning map shall be acted upon by county 
 
 
Applying section 23-6(a) and (c) to Acierno's case, Mitchell's 
memorandum went on to state: 
 "Since this property would have been accorded 
the three-year stability protection regarding 
a proposed rezoning for the site, it also 
received the protection accorded by Section 
23-6(c) of the Code . . . . 
 
 The purpose of the three-year 'moratorium' 
provision is to provide stability to the 
process.  In this case, Section 23-6(c) 
permits a lot owner three (3) years to 
establish a use that but for a recent Zoning 
amendment would have been permitted in that 
district if the particular parcel was 
(..continued) 
council within three (3) years after the 
latest of any of the following actions: 
 
 * * * 
 
  (3) Prior approval under the 
subdivision regulations of a preliminary 
plan involving any parcel of land, or 
portion thereof, whose zoning 
classification would be changed by the 
proposed amendment; provided, that the 
applicant and owner of such parcel may 
withdraw such plan and the provisions of 
this paragraph shall then cease to be 
applicable to such parcel or parcels.  
In no event shall the period permitted 
under this paragraph exceed three (3) 
years from the earlier approval under 
the subdivision regulations of a 
preliminary plan involving such parcel, 
or portion thereof. 
 
 (c) No amendment to the zoning code 
regulations shall be applicable to any parcel 
or parcels of land protected by subparagraphs 
. . . (3) . . . of subsection (a) of this 
section during the period of such protection 
. . . . 
 
New Castle County, Del., Code § 23-6(a),(c) (1992); see Acierno, 
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1683, at *46. 
 
 
protected by Paragraph (1), (3) or (4) of 
Section 23-6(a).  The protection is afforded 
only for the three-year period and the 
property owner must establish the non-
conforming use during that time.  If the use 
is not established, the Code affords no 
further protection to that particular parcel.  
Thereafter, the property owner must comply 
with the revised provisions of the Zoning 
Code. 
 
 Nor does the recordation of a plan create any 
rights, vested or otherwise.  It is the use 
that is conferred non-conforming status, not 
a plan or a permit of any kind.  Therefore, 
since Mr. Acierno did not establish a non-
conforming commercial use within the three-
year period provided for in Section 23-6(c), 
he is no longer entitled to establish any 
commercial use except those very limited 
instances where such commercial uses are now 
presently permitted in a M-1 district 




Id. at *46-48. 
 Mitchell forwarded a copy of his July 9, 1991 
memorandum to Robert O'Brien, Director, Department of Public 
Works, so that O'Brien could "'take appropriate action to ensure 
that no building permit is issued for any principal commercial 
use [on the 273 Property] . . . .'"  Id. at *48.  Mitchell then 
asked O'Brien, "[a]ccordingly, would you please take any steps 
necessary to ensure that no permits are issued for this site 
until complete review and consultation is accomplished with this 
Department and the Department of Planning.'"  Id. 
 While Mitchell was writing these memos, Acierno was 
negotiating with prospective commercial tenants for space within 
his proposed development.  Caldor, Inc. ("Caldor") was an 
 
 
important prospect.  In late 1991 Acierno applied for a permit to 
build a Caldor store.  Biloon, by letter dated December 18, 1991, 
told him: 
 "Please be advised that New Castle County 
cannot accept your building permit 
application for the proposed Caldor 
Department Store at this site.  Commercial 
ventures of this nature cannot be situated on 
lands which contain a manufacturing zoning 
classification.  Additionally, the existing 
Record Plan . . . allows for a 70,000 square 
foot building denoted as Building #4.  The 
proposed structure is 112,000 square feet.  
This is also a discrepancy which must be 




Id. at *48-49. 
 In February, 1992, the Delaware Department of Natural 
Resources and Environmental Control approved Acierno's temporary 
erosion and sediment control plan.  In May, 1992, Acierno 
resubmitted his application for a building permit in connection 
with the Property.  The accompanying plan provided for a 70,000 
square foot building drawn in accord with County standards.  On 
May 27, 1992, Biloon contacted Mitchell and informed him of 
Acierno's latest application:  "'We have another application for 
the dept. store.  This time the building plans agree with the 
record plan.  What is out next move?'"  Id. at *52.  Mitchell 
responded:  "'It is not zoned for a retail department store.  He 
does not get a permit.'"  Id.  Biloon subsequently assigned and 
then voided a building permit number for the proposed development 
project on the Property.  By letter dated June 4, 1992, Biloon 
 
 
advised Acierno:  "New Castle County still cannot accept your 
building permit application for the proposed 70,000 square foot 
Caldor Department Store at [the 273 Property]."  Id. at *54-55. 
 
 C.  Procedural History 
 On July 1, 1992, Acierno filed a complaint under 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1983 against the County and others in the district 
court.  He alleged the County's decision to deny him a building 
permit violated his constitutional rights to due process (both 
substantive and procedural) and equal protection. 
 On December 30, 1992, the district court granted 
Acierno's motion for a mandatory preliminary injunction directing 
the County to issue him a building permit.  See Acierno v. 
Mitchell, No. 92-384-SLR, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20381, at *52 
(D. Del. Dec. 30, 1992) (order granting preliminary injunction).  
The County then filed an interlocutory appeal.  On October 4, 
1993, this Court vacated the district court's opinion and order, 
held the case was not ripe and remanded with instructions to 
dismiss Acierno's section 1983 action without prejudice because 
Acierno had failed to appeal the County's refusal to issue the 
building permit to the New Castle Board of Adjustment (the 
"Board").  Acierno v. Mitchell, 6 F.3d 970, 977-78 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
 Acierno then appealed to the Board, which held an 
evidentiary hearing on December 2, 1993 and on December 16, 1993 
voted to deny Acierno a building permit.  The next day, 
December 17, 1993, Acierno filed the present suit in district 
 
 
court, repeating the allegations he made in his prior section 
1983 complaint.  On the same day, the County filed a state court 
action seeking a declaratory judgment that Acierno had no right 
to develop the Property for commercial purposes.  New Castle 
County v. Acierno, No. 13302 (Del. Ch. filed Dec. 17, 1993).  The 
state action remains pending. 
 On January 4, 1994, the district court held an 
evidentiary hearing on Acierno's motion for a preliminary 
injunction and, on February 11, 1994, issued its opinion in 
support of the mandatory injunction Acierno requested.  On 
February 16, 1994, the order granting Acierno's motion for a 
mandatory preliminary injunction requiring the County to issue a 
building permit and accord Acierno favorable treatment during 
inspections of the building process was entered.  See Acierno v. 
New Castle County, No. 93-579-SLR (D. Del. Feb. 16, 1994) (order 
granting preliminary injunction). 
 On February 17, 1994, the County filed its timely 
notice of appeal.  It also filed a motion for stay of the 
injunction pending the appeal.  On March 18, 1994, the district 
court denied the motion for a stay.  On April 6, 1994, this Court 





 D.  Acierno's Damages 
 During the Board of Adjustment hearing convened to 
determine whether Biloon had correctly denied Acierno a building 
permit, a board member asked for specific information about 
Acierno's expenses in the planning and development stages of the 
subdivision and resubdivision process.  Acierno's attorney 
refused to permit Acierno to respond, stating that he would 
"absolutely not" provide such information and that evidence of 
Acierno's expenditures could be found at "page 8, paragraph 19 of 
[the district court's December 30, 1992] Opinion."9  App. at 332.  
The Board of Adjustment found: 
 Acierno refused to testify concerning costs, 
and the documentary evidence does not prove 
that expensive and permanent improvements 
were constructed in reliance upon M-1 
sections of the subdivision and re-
subdivision plans.  No credible evidence was 
presented to the Board which proved that 
Acierno made a substantial change in position 
or incurred substantial obligations in 
reliance on the M-1 sections of the 
subdivision or re-subdivision approvals.  Any 
expenses, plans or obligations undertaken by 
Acierno were related to the commercially 
zoned portion of the plan. 
                     
9.  This Paragraph states: 
 
 In connection with these Record Plans, 
plaintiff submitted surveys, drainage area 
plans, site plans, grading and utility plans, 
sanitary sewer plans, lines and grades plans, 
entrance details, and road plans.  All of 
these plans were accepted by the various 
County and State agencies.  Plaintiff 
expended thousands of dollars in connection 
with this work. 
 
Acierno, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20381, at *10-11 (emphasis added). 
 
 
Id. at 344.  The Board also found that "any pre-construction 
expenses were attributable to the commercial portion of the site 
(for a McDonalds location) which was not the subject of the 
building permit, submitted by Acierno."  Id. at 17.10 
 On the issue of Acierno's damages and irreparable harm 
stemming from them, the district court made these additional 
findings of fact: 
 * Acierno has permanently lost the 
opportunity to lease space to Caldor; 
 
 * If Acierno, who is presently negotiating 
to lease space on the Property to other 
tenants, is unable to obtain building 
permits, those prospective tenants with 
whom he is negotiating will lease at 
other sites; and 
 
 * The continued denial of the building 
permit will diminish Acierno's ability 
to develop the property because of 




See Acierno, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1683, at *61-62. 
                     
10.  The district court did not explain why it refused to defer 
to this finding or failed to conclude it was not supported by the 
evidence before adopting contrary findings.  On appeal, the 
County challenges the district court's failure to give preclusive 
effect to the factual findings of the Board.  The district court 
acknowledged that University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 
788, 797-99 (1986), required it to give preclusive effect to the 
Board's factual findings but seems to have concluded the quoted 
finding left the question of harm open.  See Acierno, 1994 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 1683, at *9.  Its reasons for rejecting the second 
finding allocating pre-construction expenses to the McDonalds are 
not clear.  Under Kollock v. Sussex Count Bd. of Adjustment, 526 
A.2d 569 (Del. Super. 1987), a court reviewing the factual 
findings of the Board may only ignore such findings upon a 
determination that they are not supported by substantial evidence 




 II.  Jurisdiction & Standard of Review 
 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
Acierno's section 1983 claim under 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1343(3) 
(West 1993).  We have appellate jurisdiction over a district 
court's interlocutory order granting a preliminary injunction 
under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(a)(1) (West 1993) providing for appeals 
from "[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts . . . 
granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving 
injunctions . . . ."  Id.; see also Cohen v. Board of Trustees of 
Univ. of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, 867 F.2d 1455, 
1464 (3d Cir. 1989) (in banc) (injunctive order immediately 
appealable). 
 We review an order granting a preliminary injunction 
for abuse of discretion, see Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt 
Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1992), but we review 
the district court's underlying factual determinations under a 
clearly erroneous standard and consider the court's 
determinations on questions of law de novo.  See In re Assets of 
Myles Martin, 1 F.3d 1351, 1357 (3d Cir. 1993); John F. Harkins 
Co. v. Waldinger Corp., 796 F.2d 657, 658-59 (3d Cir. 1986), 
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1059 (1987). 
 
 III.  Analysis 
 On appeal, the County challenges the district court's 
conclusion that Acierno demonstrated the threat of immediate 
irreparable injury necessary to justify the mandatory preliminary 
 
 
injunctive relief granted here and also argues that the district 
court abused its discretion in crafting the terms of the 
injunction and in providing overly broad relief to Acierno. 
 In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, "'the 
moving party must generally show:  (1) a reasonable probability 
of eventual success in the litigation, and (2) that it will be 
irreparably injured pendente lite if relief is not granted to 
prevent a change in the status quo.'"  Delaware River Port Auth. 
v. Transamerican Trailer Transp., Inc., 501 F.2d 917, 919-20 (3d 
Cir. 1974) (quoting A.L.K. Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 
Inc., 440 F.2d 761, 763 (3d Cir. 1971)).  Moreover, while the 
burden rests upon the moving party to make these two requisite 
showings, the district court "should take into account, when they 
are relevant, (3) the possibility of harm to other interested 
persons from the grant or denial of the injunction, and (4) the 
public interest."  Id. at 920 (footnote omitted). 
 In general, to show irreparable harm a plaintiff must 
"demonstrate potential harm which cannot be redressed by a legal 
or an equitable remedy following a trial."  Instant Air Freight 
Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989).  
Economic loss does not constitute irreparable harm: 
 [I]t seems clear that the temporary loss of 
income, ultimately to be recovered, does not 
usually constitute irreparable injury: 
 
  "The key word in this consideration 
is irreparable.  Mere injuries, 
however substantial, in terms of 
money, time and energy necessarily 
expended in the absence of a stay, 
are not enough.  The possibility 
that adequate compensatory or other 
 
 
corrective relief will be available 
at a later date, in the ordinary 
course of litigation, weighs 




Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974) (footnotes omitted) 
(quoting Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 
925 (D.C. Cir. 1958)).  Thus, in order to warrant a preliminary 
injunction, the injury created by a failure to issue the 
requested injunction must "'be of a peculiar nature, so that 
compensation in money cannot atone for it . . . .'"  A. O. Smith 
Corp. v. F.T.C., 530 F.2d 515, 525 (3d Cir. 1976) (quoting Gause 
v. Perkins, 3 Jones Eq. 177, 69 Am. Dec. 728 (1857)).  The word 
irreparable connotes "'that which cannot be repaired, retrieved, 
put down again, atoned for. . . .'"  Id. (quoting Gause, 3 Jones 
Eq. 177, 69 Am. Dec. 728).  A party seeking a mandatory 
preliminary injunction that will alter the status quo bears a 
particularly heavy burden in demonstrating its necessity.  
Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 In concluding that Acierno demonstrated irreparable 
harm, the district court stated: 
  It is evident from the record that 
plaintiff alleges economic losses in 
connection with his claims that defendant 
deprived him of his constitutional rights to 
due process and equal protection under the 
law.  Plaintiff claims other harm as well, 
however, including damage to his reputation 
as a business person and lost capacity to 
develop as a result of lost time and tenants 
due to the instant controversy, County 





Acierno, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1683, at *93-94.  The district 
court relied heavily on Opticians Association of America v. 
Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1990), in 
support of its conclusion that Acierno would suffer irreparable 
harm if he were not immediately granted a building permit, 
pointing to our statement that "[g]rounds for finding irreparable 
injury include loss of control of reputation, loss of trade, and 
loss of good will."  Id. at 195 (citing 2 J. McCarthy, Trademarks 
and Unfair Competition § 32:44 (2d ed. 1984)).  We think our 
decision in Opticians Association of America is distinguishable, 
however, because the result in that case was heavily influenced 
by the special problem of confusion that exist in cases involving 
trademark infringement and unfair competition.  Acierno's problem 
is not analogous.11 
 The district court's reliance on Fitzgerald v. Mountain 
Laurel Racing, Inc., 607 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 
446 U.S. 956 (1980), is also misplaced.  There, we concluded 
                     
11.  In Opticians Association of America, this Court reversed an 
order denying a motion for a preliminary injunction and instead 
instructed the district court to enter an order granting the 
preliminary injunction because the court incorrectly applied 
trademark law.  Opticians Ass'n of America, 920 F.2d at 192.  
Relying on McCarthy's treatise, Trademarks and Unfair 
Competition, we concluded that the district court had not fully 
considered the severe detriment to the association's reputation 
because of the likelihood of confusing the association's services 
with those of the other group using the association's trademarks.  
Id. at 195-96 (citing 2 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair 
Competition § 32:44 (2d ed. 1984)).  Thus, we held that 
"[p]otential damage to reputation constitutes irreparable injury 
for the purpose of granting a preliminary injunction in a 
trademark case."  Id. at 196 (emphasis added). 
 
 
there was irreparable injury to the business and reputation of a 
licensed harness racing trainer as a result of his eviction from 
a racetrack.  Id. at 601.  The case does not stand for the 
proposition that any showing of potential harm to a plaintiff's 
reputation is sufficient to warrant a mandatory preliminary 
injunction that fundamentally changes the status quo.  Cf. Morton 
v. Beyer, 822 F.2d 364 (3d Cir. 1987) (reversing order granting 
preliminary injunction compelling reinstatement of a corrections 
officer with back pay following his suspension by New Jersey 
Department of Corrections).  In Morton, we decided that showing 
some potential harm to reputation is usually insufficient to 
support a conclusion that irreparable harm exists.  We 
distinguished Fitzgerald, stating "the licensee in Fitzgerald was 
potentially barred, not merely impaired, from obtaining 
employment.  No such extreme deprivation is present here."  Id. 
at 372 n.13 (citation omitted). 
 This record does not show that Acierno's reputation has 
been significantly damaged by the County's denial of a building 
permit.  Acierno's application seeks permission for a use that is 
incompatible with the current zoning ordinance.  Acierno could 
have avoided his problem if he had acted within three years after 
his Plan was filed.  It is difficult for us to see how the 
County's denial of a building permit that Acierno waited almost 
twelve years to apply for is the cause of any damage Acierno's 
reputation as a real estate developer may suffer.  It is also 
difficult for us to believe that this particular development is 
uniquely important to Acierno in light of the testimony he gave 
 
 
at his deposition about all the other real estate projects in 
which he is interested.  See App. at 184-97. 
 Rather, we think the inquiry into irreparable harm in 
Acierno's case must focus on whether money damages can make him 
whole if his wish to develop the property as a commercial mall is 
wrongfully delayed.  Acierno testified on deposition that 
"[potential tenants] are lined up at the door to lease space at 
the site . . . ."  Id. at 559.  He acknowledged that no potential 
tenant had threatened to locate elsewhere if the district court 
denied the preliminary injunction.  Id. at 557-58.  His testimony 
indicates that no other site in the area presently poses any 
direct threat to his development: 
 [O]ther sites in the area, are either not 
zoned or if they are they don't have the 
traffic capacity to be able to use them for a 
store as large [as required by one potential 
tenant]. . . .  [My site] is probably the 
only site . . . that can be developed 
nowadays in [the metropolitan] area because 
of the traffic problems that exist there. 
 
 
Id. at 553.  The district court's finding that intervening 
commercial development might reduce the feasibility of Acierno's 
development is clearly erroneous.12 
                     
12.  The only evidence which may indicate otherwise is said to 
appear at page 22 of the transcript of Acierno's deposition, 
where he testified:  "Every major tenant we've talked to 
. . . has said that they will go elsewhere . . . if the 
[building] permit does not issue."  Brief for Appellee at 41.  We 
assume this reference is accurate, though it is not included in 
the appendix, but we believe it is nevertheless insufficient to 
demonstrate a right to a mandatory preliminary injunction. 
 
 
 Finally, we consider Acierno's contention that he will 
lose a key anchor tenant with whom he is presently negotiating if 
he does not get a building permit forthwith.  He argues that the 
loss of this anchor tenant will have a domino effect on his 
ability to attract other tenants.  He says that there is no way 
to measure his financial loss if the deal falls through because 
he is only engaged in negotiations with the proposed anchor 
tenant and has reached no final agreement with it on financial 
terms.  Like Janus gazing forward and backward each New Year, 
this argument points in two directions.  The negotiating stage 
Acierno is now engaged in could be thought of as making any harm 
he will suffer if the building permit is delayed too remote and 
speculative to justify a mandatory injunction.  As we stated in 
Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 614 F.2d 351 
(3d Cir. 1980): 
 [M]ore than a risk of irreparable harm must 
be demonstrated.  The requisite for 
injunctive relief has been characterized as a 
"clear showing of immediate irreparable 
injury," or a "presently existing actual 
threat; [an injunction] may not be used 
simply to eliminate a possibility of a remote 
future injury . . . ." 
 
 
Id. at 358 (citations omitted) (quoting Ammond v. McGahn, 532 
F.2d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 1976) and  Holiday Inns of America, Inc. 
v. B & B Corp., 409 F.2d 614, 618 (3d Cir. 1969)); see also 
Campbell Soup Co. v. Conagra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91-92 (3d Cir. 




 Even if we view Acierno's anchor tenant's problem in 
the direction he asks, his problem is not solved on this record's 
showing of irreparable harm.  An inability to precisely measure 
financial harm does not make that harm irreparable or 
immeasurable.  If Acierno has a right to proceed with commercial 
development on the land he has allowed to remain undeveloped more 
than twelve years after the Delaware Supreme Court directed the 
County to approve and file his Plan, we think any actionable harm 
he may suffer, if it is ultimately determined that the County 
violated his constitutional rights, can be remedied by an award 
of money damages.  This record shows no more than a potential for 
purely economic injury to Acierno.  If Acierno succeeds on the 
merits of his claim, we believe that economic loss, if it occurs, 
can be measured in monetary terms and satisfied by a damage award 
after trial on the merits.13 
                     
13.  On remand, however, we think the district court would be 
wise to reconsider whether it should abstain from further action 
in this case, particularly in connection with the injunctive 
relief it is asked to issue, in light of the pending state court 
action in which the County seeks a declaratory judgment affirming 
the County's refusal to issue a building permit to Acierno.  A 
party arguing in favor of abstention under the principles of 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), must show: 
 
 (1) there are ongoing state proceedings 
involving the would-be federal plaintiffs 
that are judicial in nature, (2) the state 
proceedings implicate important state 
interests, and (3) the state proceedings 
afford an adequate opportunity to raise the 
federal claims . . . . 
 
Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 882 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing 
Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 
U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).  The existence of these facts, however, 
does not compel abstention.  Id.; see also Gwynedd Properties, 
 
 
 IV.  Conclusion 
 For these reasons, the district court's order granting 
Acierno a preliminary injunction compelling the County to issue a 
building permit and discontinue any interference with Acierno's 
development of the Property will be reversed and the case 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
(..continued) 
Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd Township, 970 F.2d 1195, 1201 (3d Cir. 
1992) ("[W]here federal proceedings parallel but do not interfere 
with the state proceedings, the principles of comity underlying 
Younger abstention are not implicated.").  Indeed, 
 
 [a] federal plaintiff may pursue parallel 
actions in the state and federal courts so 
long as the plaintiff does not seek relief in 
the federal court that would interfere with 
the state judicial process.  Moreover, since 
parallel proceedings always involve a 
likelihood that a final merits judgment in 
one will effectively terminate the other, it 
necessarily follows that the mere fact that a 
judgment in the federal suit might have 
collateral effects in the state proceeding is 
not interference for Younger purposes. 
 
Marks, 19 F.3d at 885 (footnote omitted) (citing Gwynedd 
Properties, Inc., 970 F.2d at 1200-03). 
